STONE v. FAIRBURY, &c., RAILWAY CO.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONSSupreme Court of Illinois.
JOHN STONE v. TIE FAIRBURY, PONTIAC AND NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.
The provision of the Constitution of Illinois, "that private property shall not
he taken or damaged for public use without just compensation," must be so construed as to protect the interests of private citizens, while guarding the commercial
interests of the country and the general good of the public.
In order to enable a party to recover damages resulting from the exercise of
the power of eminent domain, he must show that his property has sustained a
direct and physical injury.
The throwing of smoke and cinders from a railroad engine moving upon its
track, upon residence property, constitutes a direct physical injury, for which the
plaintiff may recover.

on the case brought in the Circuit Court of Livingston
county. The declaration contained two counts to which a demurrer was filed by the defendant and sustained by the court; the
plaintiff elected to abide by his declaration, and the court rendered
judgment against him for costs. The only question presented for
decision in this court was as to the sufficiency of the declaration.
It was averred in each count of the declaration substantially that
the plaintiff owns and occupies as a residence certain property
fronting on Walnut street in the town of Fairbury, that the defendant constructed along, upon and over said street its railroad,
and ran daily its locomotives and trains thereon ; that smoke and
cinders were cast and thrown from the engines and locomotives in
and over the property of plaintiff, thereby greatly damaging the
same.
TRESPASS

The opinion of the court was delivered by
CRAIG, J.-The averments in the declaration are admitted to
be true by the demurrer, and from them alone we are to determine
whether the plaintiff has a cause of action. By the 19th section
of the Bill of Rights of our constitution, it is declared that every
person ought to find a certain remedy in the laws, for all injuries
and wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or reputation; he ought to obtain by law right and justice fully and without denial, promptly, and without delay. And by the 13th section
of the same instrument it is declared that private property shall
not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.
Such compensation when not made by the state, shall be ascer-
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tained by a jury, as shall be prescribed by law. The fee of land
taken for railroad tracks without consent of the owners thereof,
shall remain in such owners, subject to the use for which it is taken.
While it must be conceded that an incorporated town or city owns
the fee simple title to* the public streets, and has the exclusive
power to control and regulate the same, and in the exercise of
that power may rightfully authorize and permit a railroad company to occupy and use a public street with its railroad track, yet
under the organic law of the state, the railroad company must be
held responsible to property owners upon the street for such direct
or physical damage as shall result from the construction of the
road, or the operation of the same after its completion. The comhierce of the country and the unbounded wants of the public
demand that public streets in towns and cities should be used by
railroad companies in carrying passengers and transporting freights,
and it must necessarily happen that streets will be used for various
legitimate purposes, which will to a greater or less extent discommode persons residing or doing business upon them, and just to
that extent damage their property, and yet such damage is incident
to all city -property, and for it a party can claim no remedy:
M11oses v. Pittsburght, Fort Wayne . Chicago Railroad Co:, 21 Ill.
522. The difficulty of crossing a railroad track, the detention by
trains, the frightening of horses, the danger to persons crossing
the track, the noise of the trains, and various other things that
might be named, are inconveniences which property-owners on a
street where a railroad is located have to suffer, yet to hold that
such could recover damages would in effect prevent the construction
of a railroad upon a public street. The clause in the Constitution,
"private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation," must receive a reasonable construction.
While the interest of the private citizen should be guarded and
protected, the commercial interests of the country and the great
good of the public should not be lost sight of. In the state of
Massachusetts, a statute provides that railroad companies shall
pay all damages caused by the construction and maintaining the
road. Under this statute the petitioner, who owned a tract of land
abutting on Western Avenue in the city of Lowell, set out that
the railroad company constructed its road over the avenue between
petitioner's land and the city; that in passing to or from the city,
the railroad had to be crossed; petitioner claimed his land was
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damaged by the road being constructed over Western. Avenue.
Chief Justice SHAW, in delivering the opinion of the court, said:
"The law does not propose to grant indemnity for all losses occasioned by the laying of a railroad. If it did, it would ext(nd to
turnpikes and canals, the .value of which is diminished or destroyed by loss to custom, to taverns and public-houses deserted or
left in obscurity, to stage-coach proprietors, to owners of dwellinghouses, manufactories, wharves, and all other real estate in towns and
villages from which a line of travel has been diverted. In laying
down a rule in regard to 'what might be considered an element of
damages, lie says: " That all direct damage to real estate by passing
over it or part of it, or which affects the estate directly, though it
does not pass over it, as by a deep cut or high embankment, so
near land or buildings as to prevent or diminish the use of them,
by endangering the fall of building., the caving in of earth, the
draining of wells, the* diversion of water-courses so far as these
are the necessary results of suitable and proper works, also the
necessary blasting of a ledge of rocks so near to houses as to
cause damage, running a track so near them as to cause imminent
appreciable danger by fire, by obliterating or obstructing private
ways leading to houses and buildings. These and perhaps others
of like kind we think are proper subjects for the assessment of
damages." Under the Massachusetts statute, which is somewhat
analogous to our Constitution, the court seem to lay down the rule
that the damage in order to enable a recovery must be a direct
physical injury, which is no doubt the proper rule. In the declaration in this case many things are averred that are not regarded
as material, yet as we understand the averments they are in substance that smolce and cinders were thrown from the engines of
the defendant on the property of plaintiff, by means whereof his
property was greatly damaged. If this be true, and the averments
are to be so taken, the plaintiff has sustained a direct and physical
injury to his property for which he is entitled to recover. A
majority of the court are therefore of opinion that the declaration
was sufficient, and the demurrer was improperly sustained. The
judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
By the Constitution of Illinois, adopt- of eminent domain by requiring corned in 1870, an additional limitation was pensation to be made for property dainplaced upon the exercise of the power aged, although not taken; a provision

STONE v. FAIRBURY, &c., RAILWAY CO.
which was not then embraced in the rule to be, that if the doing of the act
other American constitutions, and was was in the reasonable exercise of an aufound in the statutes of only a few of the thority conferred, and the party constates.
ducts himself without malice, negligence
The weight of authority supports the or unskilfulness, he is not responsible
po.-ition that in the absence of all con- for any damage which may be occattitutional and statutory provision upon sioned to another. Besides, it must be
the subject, railways are not liable for a damage different in kind, and not
necessary consequential damages to merely in degree; not that one sustains
land-owners, no portion of whose land an injury greater than that of others,
is taken, where they construct and ope- but one special and peculiar to himself:
rate their roads in a skilfnl and prudent Proprietors of Lrocks and Canals Y.
manner: I Redfield on Railways 294; Nashua and Lowell R. R. Co., 1OCushMonongahela No. Co. v. Coons, 6 W. & ing 390, cited in principal case. In
S. 101 ; Philadelphiaand Trenton R. R. passing along the street of a city or vilCo., 6 Whart. 25 ; Henry v. Pittsburgh lage, the smoke of the engine, if it can
and Alleqht,ql Bridge Co., 6 W. & S. extend to the next estate beyond the one
85 : Cananduiguaand NiagaraRailway crossed or touched by the railroad, why
v. Payne, 16 Barb. 273; Radcliff v. not to the next, and the next, which
Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 Comstock 195
may be affected less in degree, but in
flatch Y. -erniont Cent. R., 25 Vt. 49.
the same manner? Under the MassaIn the principal case, no part of the chusetts statute, referred to in the prinplaintiff's premises were taken, nor cipal case, where damages were claimed
does it appear that the throwing of the consequent upon the running of trains,
smoke and cinders from the engines of such as noise, smoke and soot from
the delfendant upon the property of the passing trains, it was held thai "these
plaintiff, which was the damage pom- incidental effects are the natural and
plained of, happened otherwise than in inevitable consequences of the exercise
the ordinary use of properly constructed of the franchise which the legislature
engines upon the defendant's roadway.
has granted to the corporation. They
Upon such a state of facts, it is mat- do not, therefore, constitute a public
ter of grave question whether the throw- nuisance, and, independently of the
ing of smoke and cinders is a proper taking of land, they cannot be made a
element of damage against a railway, ground for the recovery of damages, as
in any form of action. It is believed no for a private injury :" Wt:lker v. Old
engine has Yet been introduced, which, Colony and Nwport Railway Co., 103
with the most skilful handling, could Mass. 14.
avoid emitting smoke and cinders in its
By the English Railways Clauses
uSe, and especially so where bituminous Consolidation Act, S Viet c. 20, comcoals are used, which is a necessity in pensation is to he given not only for
large districts of the country. To give lands taken, but for those injuriously
damages, therefore, upon mere proof of affected by the construction of any railthe act and the consequent injury, where way, and for all damage sustained by
no negligence or unskilfulness appears, the owners or occupiers of lands by reak to punish for the lawful use of the son of the exercise of the powers coniranchise. It is not every damage, the ferred by the act upon railways. Under
cause of which may be traced to the act this act it was held that the owner of a
of another, that renders that other re- house, none of whose lands have been •
sponsible. We understand the general taken for the purposes of the railway,
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there is neither negligence,.nor misfeasance, nor anything avoidable, the common-law right of action is taken away,
and the compensation f6r the damage
must be sought under the statute.
If the same construction shall be
placed upon similar legislative provisions in this country, and the doctrine
of Walker v. Old Colony and Ncwport
Railway Co. become established law,
then compensation under statutei cannot
be given for these incidental effects of
the running of trains where no land is
taken. And as to the common-law
remedy, where no negligence or unskilfulness appears, it would seem that the
uncertainty which must ever attend an
estimate of injury by smoke and cinders
thus produced ; the fact that in the nature of things the damage can'tever be
special and peculiar to one only; and
223.
While, therefore, this case is not very that it is caused in the legitimate exerstrong authority for showing the judg- cise of a right conferred hy law, all
ment of the Queen's Bench in the same conspire to characterize it as danium
case to have been wrong, it does decide, abque injuria, for which no action will
following Vaughan v. Taff Vale Rail- lie.
C.H.W.
cannot recover compensation in respect
of injury to the house, depreciating its
value, caused by vibration, smoke and
noise in running locomotives with trains
in the ordinary manner, after the construction of the railway: Brand v..Ham,nerstaith and City Railway Co., Law
Rep. I Q. B. 130.
Upon appeal to the Exchequer Chamber, this judgment was reversed ; but
or the eight judges who sat at the hearing, three only concurred in the reversal,
two having ceased to be members of the
court, two of those remaining did not
participate in the judgment, and of the
others, one gave a dissenting opinion.
ERLE, C. J. of the Common Pleas, who
had been a member of the court when
the cause was argued, also prepared a
dissenting opinion: Law Rep. 2 Q. B.

way Co., 5 H. & N. 679, that where

Supreme Court of -Errorsof Connecticut.
RICHARDSON v. ROWLAND.
Whether the law of maintenance and champerty is recognised as a part of the
common law of Connecticut: Quere. The court inclines to think it is not.
It is not a part of the common law of the state of New York.
The defendant, thinking it necessary, in securing the benefit of certain real
estate which he had attached in the state of New York, to pay off a mortgage of
$2000 upon the property, proposed to the plaintiff that if he would advance the
sum required and superintend the litigation, paying his own expenses, he would
give him half the net avails of the suit, but that if nothing was recovered the
expenses of the litigation should be shared equally. The plaintiff accepted the
proposition, went twice to the state of New York with the money, paying his own
expenses, and consulted the attorney in charge of the suit, who concluded that it
was not necessary to raise the mortgage ; soon after which the defence of the suit
was abandoned, judgment rendered in favor of the present defendant and the
amount of the judgment paid over to him. Held, in a suit brought to recover
half of the net avails of the judgment-i. That as the contract was to be performed in the state of New York, it was governed by the law of that state. 2.
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That it was not void by the law of that state as a champertous contract. 3. That
the plaintiff was to be regarded as having sufficiently performed his part of the
contract, its literal performance having been excused.

ASSUMPSIT for money had and received and work and labor
done; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven county. The
following facts were reported by an auditor:Ii July 1858, the defendant owned a claim for money against
one Sturges, which he had put in suit by attaching certain property in Brooklyn, in the state of New York, in which he claimed
that Sturges had a valuable interest; which interest other parties
disputed.
There was a mortgage for $2000 on this property, which the
defen dant was advised it was necessary for the success of his suit
to raise.
In view of this necessity, the defendant proposed to the
plhitiff that if he would advance the sum required to raise the
mortgage, and generally superintend the litigation, paying his
personal expenses, the defendant would pay to him one-half of the
net avails of the suit; but if nothing should be recovered, the
expenses of .the litigation to be shared equally. This proposition
was accepted by the plaintiff.
Thereupon the plaintiff went to Brooklyn twice, with the sum
necessary to raise the mortgage, and consulted the attorney in'
charge of the suit, paying his own travelling expenses. But the
attorney did not on either occasion deem it necessary to raise the
mortgage, and not long afterward the defence of the suit was substantially abandoned, and judgment was recovered, and about the
1st day of October 1858, the defendant received, as the net avails
of the suit, the sum of $468.53, no part of which has been paid to
the plaintiff.
The plaintiff was at all times ready to pay the sum required to
raise the mortgage, and to do anything else that might be necessary by way of managing the suit; but, owing to the settlement,
nothing further was in fact done by or required of him than to
make the two journeys to Brooklyn, with the money -which be had
raised for the purpose, paying his personal expenses, and to hold
the necessary consultations on those occasions with the attorney in
Brooklyn.
If, upon these facts, the law should be so that the defendant
was bound to pay to the plaintiff one-half of the net avails thus
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received, then the auditor found that the defendant was indebted
to the plaintiff upon that account in the sum of $234.27, for money
had and received for the plaintiff's use, October 1st 1858, with
interest from that date. If otherwise, that the defendant was not
indebted to the plaintiff upon that account.
There were other items in the accounts of the parties entering
into the final result, about which no question was made.
Upon these facts the case was reserved for the advice of this
court.
.E.K.Poster and Alling, for the plaintiff.
1. The plaintiff performed his part of the contract and earned
the stipulated compensation, and should receive it : Lincoln v.
McClatchie, 36 Conn. 136. If there was any slight variation in
the performance, it was with the consent of the defendant, and
does not affect the right to the contract price: Ellis v. Willard,
9 N. York 529; Whitney v. Brooklyn, 5 Conn. 415; Champion
v. Hartshorne, 9 Id. 569; Smith v. Lewis, 24 Id. 624.
2. The contract was not invalid on account of champerty or
maintenance. In this state, ever since the year 1809, champerty
and maintenance have been regulated by statute. The English
common law of maintenance and champerty has not been generally
adopted in the United States, and was never the common law of
this state: Sherley v. Riggs, 11 Humph. 53; Bayard v. McLane,
8 Harris 139, 209; Danforth v. Streeter, 28 Vt. 490; Wright v.
Meek, 3 Iowa 472; Sedgwick v. Stanton, 14 N. Y. 289; Stoddart v. Mlix, 14 Conn. 24.
8. The validity of the contract is to be determined by the law
of New York, the place of performance: Burrell v. Root, 40 N.
York 496; Everett v. TFendryes, 19 1d. 436 ; Carnegie v. Mforrison, 2 Mete. 397 ; Penobscot & Iennebec 1. R. Co. v. Bartlett,
12 Gray 244; Giddings v. Eastman, 1 Clark Ch. 19; Thurston
v. Percival, 1 Pick. 417; Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Bassford, 6 Iill 526. The common law of maintenance and champerty, so fair as applicable to this contract, had ceased to exist long
before the making of this contract in the state of New York:
Sedgwick v. Stanton, 14 N. York 289; Durgin v. Ireland. Id.
322; Voorhees v. Dorr, 51 Barb. 580.
Bronson, for the defendant.-The contract under which the
plaintiff seeks to recover is void for maintenance and champerty.
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The contract 'was madp and was to be performed in this state, and
is to be construed according to the laws of this state. The facts
show both maintenance and champerty. Champerty is the "unlawfid maintenance of a suit in consideration- of some bargain to
have part of the thi,,g in dispute :" 1 Hawkins P. C., ch. 84, § 1.
It is a crime at common law, and in the absence of any statute the
law in respect to it is in force in this state : State v. Danforth, 3
Conn. 114 ; Wallis v. Duke of Portland,3 Yes. 502; Thurston
v. Percival, 1 Pick. 415; Lathrop v. Anlherst Bank, 9 Mete.
490: _4lartin v. L0lark, 8 It. Isl. 389; aregerson v. Inlay, 4
Blatehf. 503; 1 Hawkins P. C., ch. 83, § 36. That the money
was to be furnished to sustain a suit in the state of New York does
not alter the case. For the crime is malun in se, and no reason
can be shown which confines it to the maintenance of a suit in this
state. The reason of the law does not admit of such a restricted
meaning; acts of maintenance and champerty being prohibited
because they tend to oppression and the stirring up of strife.
Unless the contrary is shown, it is to be presumed that the common law in regard to maintenance and champerty is in force in
the state of New York: Thurston v. Percival, 1 Pick. 415.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FOSTER, J.-The only point presented by the finding for ourconsideration is, whether the plaintiff is entitled, upon the facts
found, to recover one-half of the sum of $468.53, the amount
received by the defendant as the net avails of his suit against
Sturges. The plaintiff claims one-half of this sum under a contract with the defendant by which he was to render him certain.
services in connection with the suit and receive half the net amount
recovered; the defendant resists the demand, claiming that the.
contract is void for maintenance and champerty.
Maintenance at common law signifies an unlawful taking in
hand or upholding of quarrels, or sides, to the disturbance or
hindrance of common right. The maintaining of one side, in
consideration of some bargain to have part of the thine in dispute,
is called champerty. Champerty therefore is a species of maintenance.
Maintenance was an offence at common law, and divers statutes:
have been passed in England by Parliament regarding it, com-.
rtencing as early as the reign of Edward I. The reasons upon,
VOL. XXIII.-I I
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which the ancient doctrine rested in England can now scarcely be
said to exist, and the law has, at times, been regarded with disfavor. As long ago as 1791, Mr. Justice BULLER, in the case of
Masters v. Miller, 4 T. R. 340, speaks of a particular application of the law of maintenance almost in the language of contempt.
Our statute against unlawful maintenance, first passed in 180J,
forbade certain officers of the law, attorneys and counsellors,
sheriffs, deputy sheriffs and constables, from buying any bond, bill,
promissory writing, book debt, or other chose in action, under certain penalties. As modified in 1848, and as the law now stands
in our statutes, if either of the above-named officers shall, with
intent to make gain by the fees of collection, purchase any chose
in action, and commence a suit upon the same, he shall forfeit a
sum not exceeding $100.
As the plaintiff is not one of the officers named in our statute,
that statute is not interposed by the defendant in the way of a
recovery; the common law is the law relied on.
We are not aware of any case where the law of maintenance
and champerty has been considered and passed upon by this court.
It is alluded to by CHURCH, J., in giving the opinion of the court
in the case of Stoddard v. Mix, 14 Conn. 23, 24, and by ELLSWORTH, J., in Bridgeport Bank v. New York & N. Haven I. B.
Co., 30 Conn. 273.
Some of our sister states have adopted the common law on this
subject and some have not. Massachusetts and Rhode Island
xecognise the rule of the common law: Thurston v. Percival, 1
Pick. 415; Lathrop v. Amherst Bank, 9 Met. 489; Martin v.
'Clark, 8 R. Isl. 389. Among the states which discard the rule,
are Vermont, Delaware, Tennessee and Iowa: Danforth v. Streeter,
.28 Verm. 490; Bayard v. M.cLane, 3 IIarrington 139, 209;
Therley v. Riggs, 11 Humph. 53; NWright v. Meek, 3 Iowa 472.
There are such broad distinctions in the state of society between
'Great Britain and this country, that the reasons which make a law
against maintenance and champerty salutary or necessary there,
do not exist here; certainly not to the same extent. Mr. Justice
4GRIER, in giving the opinion of the court in Roberts v. Cook, 20
1How. 467, says that the ancient English doctrines respecting
maintenance or champerty have not found favor in the United
States. The enforcement of the law here would not always, perhaps
not generally, promote justice, Mr. Chief Justice PARKER, in giving
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the opinion of the court in Tkurston v. Percival,1 Pick. 417,
says, "It sometimes may be useful and convenient, where one has
a just demand which lie is not able from poverty to enforce, that
a more fortunate friend should assist him, and wait for his compensation until the suit is determined, and be paid out of the fruits
of it."
The contract between these parties, however, was in regard to a
suit pending in the state of New York ; the property attached was
there situate; the services to be performed were to be performed
there; and the money to be recovered, if recovered at all, was there
to be recovered. The contract in short was to be performed in
the state of New York. The law of New York therefore must
necessarily govern the contract: Commonwealth of Kentucky v.
Bassford, 6 Hill 526. It becomes quite unnecessary to decide
what the law of Connecticut, or of other states, may be bn the
subject of champerty and maintenance.
The law of New York upon this subject is very clearly and
explicitly laid down by the Court of Appeals of that state in the
case of Stanton v. Sedgwick, 14 N. Y. 289. The facts in that
case, briefly-stated, are these. One Trowbridge undertook, at his
own expense, to obtain for the defendant, Stanton, title from the
state of New York to a certain lot of land in the city of Syracuse,.
in that state, then used and occupied by Stanton for a stone yard.
Stanton had made erections on the lot, exceeding the value of
$200, by virtue of which he had acquired a pre-emption right to
purchase it from the state, under a certain legislative act then in
force. Stanton agreed to convey to Trowbridge, by a good and
sufficient conveyance, in consideration of the above-mentioned expenses and trouble, one undivided half of the lot free from encumbrance or lien except for the purchase-money; both parties to
share mutually the cost or purchase price to be paid to the state
therefor.
Trowbridge performed the contract on his part; he procured a
patent to be duly issued to Stanton, and paid to him one-half of
the purchase-money advanced to the state. Trowbridge then assigned his interest in the contract to the plaintiff, Sedgwick, and a
demand of a conveyance of the one-half of the lot was made, which
Stanton refused to give, and this action was brought to enforce
the contract. The case was tried at a special term, and judgment
was given requiring the defendant to convey to the plaintiff the
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undivided half of the premises. The defendant excepted, and the
judgment was affirmed at the general term, and on appeal tlht
judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The doctrine of this case is, that the law of maintenance and
champerty is no.t in force in.that state, except as contained in their
statutes. The opinion, a very elaborate one, pronounced apparently on very full consideration, was given by SELDEN, J. No
question seems to have been made but that the contract sought
to be enforced was within the definition of champerty at common
law. The statute of the state then existing, 1856, prohibited any
officer or other person from taking any conveyance of lands from
any person not in possession, while such lands were the subject of
controversy by suit, knowing the pendency of such suit ; and also
prohibited the buying or selling of any pretended title to lands,
unless the grantor and those under whom he claimed should have
been in possession for the space of a year before the sale, mortgages of lands by persons not in possession, and conveyances by
such persons to those in possession, being excepted.
•There was nothing in the contract which the plaintiff there
sought to enforce, in contravention of the provisions of this statute.
The same may be said of the case at bar. Judge SELDEN says,
page 801, "I still think, in view of the manifest tendency of
modern judicial opinion, as well as of the plain scope and intent
of our legislation on the subject, that not a vestige of the law of
maintenance, including that of champerty, now remains in this
state, except what is contained in the revised statutes." See also
Durgin v. Ireland, 14 New York 322; Voorhies v. Dorr, 51
Barb. 580.
We see nothing in the character of this contract contrary to the
principles of natural justice and equity, and feel no repugnance
therefore in allowing the plaintiff to recover. lie has not, it is
true, literally performed the contract, so far as raising the mortgage which rested on the property attached is concerned. But he
procured the money with which to raise it; took it twice to Brooklyn, New York, for that purpose ; and was prevented from doing
it by the defendant's attorney, who advised him that it was unnecessary. We think that was a sufficient performance. We
advise the Superior Court to render judgment for the plaintiff.
This case seems to us one of general
interest to the profession throughout the

country, in two respects. 1. The subject of champerty and maintenance is,
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in itself considered, one of very consider-

S. 617; Kellar v. Blancard, 21 La.

able practical importance in connection Ann. 38. So advancing money to enwith the general administration of jus- able one to prosecute his suit has been
held no offenlce: Peride v. Dunn, 3
tice. Scarcely u term passes in any of
our higher eourt.; tl:at actions atre not Johns. Ch. 508. And a promise to pay
found, coming, more or less, into the money for land itn suit in consideration
category of chanperty or maintenance. of a deed of the same, the amount to he
The parties find their witnesses absent dependent upon the event of the suit,
and scattered over the country on the but a portion t(o e paid at once and bevery ere of an impending trial, sud- fore the suit is determined, is not chaindenly pnhed on in consequence of perty: Nickols v. Bunting, 3 Hawks. 86.
other cases failing to e tried. In such Btt the purchase of pretended titles to
emergencies the neighbors atd families land of those oat of possession, in order
of the respe.tive parries volunteer to rin to disturb tile tenants in possession, was
all night, in every direction, to gather held an indictable offence in Massachuup the loiterers or tie fnugitives. In tile setts, at an early day, without any special statute: Swet v. Poor, 11 Mass.
early days of the common law, when
maintenance received a more extended 553; Ecerenden v. Beaumont, 7 Id. 78;
lfVlcot v. Kniqld, 6 Id. 421 ; Brinley v.
,onstrurtion, such aid in supporting
sutits, especially where, as is more com- WIiting, 5 Pick. 359 ; Lathrop v. Ammonly the fact now, money was ad- herst Jatlk, 9 Met. 489.

But in Kentucky it has been held not
unlawful for one, employing counsel to
institute proceedings against one for
slander, to stipulate to pay such counsel
a percentum upon the amount recovered:
Ecans v. Bell, 6 Dana 479. So also of
a contract to pay the attorney prosecuting a suit for land one-half its value :
Wilhite v. Roberts, 4 Dana 172. And
in l1oveij v. Hobson, 51 Me. 65, while the
judges concur in holding that by the
adoption of the common law of chainperry and maintenance by the Massachusetts courts, while their jurisdiction
of a fund, to enable him to prosecute his extended over the state of Maine, it unsuit, and to take a mortgage upon the questionably obtains there, excpt as modified by statute, they still consider that
property in contest for the security of
the money so advanced. And there is under these statutes rights of entry upon
no rule better settled now than that one land must be held assignable: It. St.,
is not guilty of maintenance in making e. 73, ? I. And in other states it has
a bond fide purchase of choses in action : been held no objection to a contract
Thallhmer v. Brinckerlhff, 3 Cowen with the attorney prosecuting a suit,
645 ; Datifortl v. Streeter, 28 Vt. 490- that fie was to have half or any other
496. So the assignment of rights of portion of the sum recovered : M1oody v.
entry upon land has been held no Harper, 38 Miss. 599; Rjan v. Martin,
16 Wise. 57. But see Underwood v.
offence tiler statutes atrainst chaiperty anld maintenance: Oldham v. Rileq, 19 Wise. 412 ; Stearns v. Felker,
Rowcan, 4 Bibb 545 ; Denn v. Bissant, 28 Id. 594.
Coxe 220; Lewis v. Bde, 17 How. U.
Some of the states do not seem
vanced by these volunteer friends to
meet the exigencies of the witnesses,
either for trancportation or support,
would clearly come within the definition
of " maintaining suits," thus subjecting
the well-meaning friends of the parties
to very serious penal consequences.
But that state of things has long since
passed away in England, and never
had any existence in this country. In
Cockell v. Taylor, 15 Beavan 103, it
was held no offence for one to advance
money to one of the parties to asuit, the
plaintifl" in this case, for the recovery
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to regard the rules of the common law
as to champerty and maintenance a, in
full operation, independent of statutes :
Schaferman v. O'Brien, 28 Md. 565. But
in others the courts refuse to adopt the
rule that counsel may stipulate for a
portion of the aviails of the suit over
and above all expenses out of pocket:
Boardman v. Thompson, 25 Iowa 487.
2. We have thus referred sufficiently
to the decisions in the different stales to
show that the law of champerty and
maintenance is not regarded as having
much stringency of operation independent of special statutes. This is the
second question involved in this case,
which seems to us of great moment.
Where, as in the American states, the
criminal code is exclusively statutory, or
mainly so, it seems to us most unfortunate to allow a loophole to remain
open for the admission of certain offences
as existing at common law. It is so
loose and indefinite, and so liable to
abuse, that tyranny itself could not de-

sire a more effective instrumfient. And we
trust that where such offenceq have been
recognized )*vthe courts, the legislature
will feel the indispensable importance of
having them clearly defined by supplementary statutes, and all further constructive oflbnces, as existing at common law, strictly prohibited in the
future.
We do not object to declaring contracts which tend needlessly to the fostering of useless litigation or speculation in lawsuits, void and inoperative
upon general principles of sound policy
ant good order. The rule adopted in
Ohio, that where there is no statute
against champerty and maintenance no
one can be puni,hed criminally for the
offence, as at common law, but that the
courts will not give effect to champertous contract%, upon the general principle that they are contrary to sound
policy and the good order of social life,
is very just: Keg v. Vatter, I HamI. F. R.
mond 132.

United States Circuit Court. Eastern District of Missouri.
DANIEL 0. TAYLOR, ADM'R., V. STEAMBOAT COMMONWEALTII.
A maritime lien will be created for repairs done on a boat or vessel at the home
port, if the repairs are made on the credit of the boat or vessel ; but where the
person doing the work stipulates for other and different security from that of the
boat or vessel, the maritime lien is waived and cannot he enforced.
Where a party in his libel sets up an admiralty lien, he cannot be allowed if
that fails to set up and rely upon a common-law or statutory lien.

TH.Is was an appeal from a decree of the District Court upon a
libel in rem. The facts appear in the report of the case when
before the District Court: 13 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 502.
G. Campbell, for the Steamboat, appellant.
Krum J- Patrick, for libellant.
MILLER, Circuit J.-The owner of the steamboat Commonwealth

is a resident of St. Louis; the repairs therefore were done in what,
,- admiralty, is technically known as the "home port" of the
vessel, and our Supreme Courts have decided for forty or fifty
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years that no admiralty lien exists by reason of supplies and
repairs furi.ishel in the home port of the vessel. There is no
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States reversing or
(.hangig that doctrine, but the sentiments of the profession of
the country-that part of the profession which devotes itself to
the admiralty practice-and the sentiment, I think, of the parties
interested in vessels, has been that that doctrine is not the correct
one. It is a doctrine which we have derived from the English
courts, and it is the doctrine of the English courts that no such
admiralty lien can be had in the home port of the country. The
English courts say, that when a man has a lien on a vessel of that
kind, he holds possession of her, like the lien of a carpenter or a
carriage-maker for repairing anything in his trade; and while he
holds possession of that lien, if he keeps possession, he may have
such statutory lien as the laws of the land give him ; but he has
no maritime lien for such services in a home port, and we have
followed that doctrine. It is not the doctrine of the continental
countries, it was not the doctrine of the civil law. The doctrine
is the other way in all the continental courts. Our courts, however, have followed the English courts in that, and held that if
supplies or repairs are furnished in a foreign port, that is in
any port where the vessel is found needing those supplies or repairs,,
other than that in which the owner lives, the admiralty law creates
a lien on the vessel. Supplies and repairs can be furnished, and
the man that furnishes them has a lien on the vessel on the ground
that the owner is not there, that it is necessary that the repairs
should be made, that they are necessary to the vessel in order to
enable it to prosecute a voyage, and that the master having ordered
them, the merchant may furnish them in a foreign port to the
master and have a lien on the vessel. We have followed that
doctrine in the courts of the United States, but as I said before
there has been a very strong feeling that the doctrine ought to
extend to the home ports, and a rule which the Supreme Court of
the United States had prescribed for the proceedings and practice
in admiralty courts, which forbids the bringing of a suit in rem in
that class of cases, has been repealed by the Supreme Court. I
violate no propriety, I think, in saying that the Supreme Court
repealed that rule with a view for consideration, and it will come
up; and it is involved in this case to some extent, or is supposed
to be involved in this case. I have no hesitation myself in saying
in this case that if there was nothing more than the fact stated
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originally, that Captain Taylor repaired this vessel to- tile extent
of $21,000, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.
which confirmed the lien and ordered the vessel to be sold and the
money to be appropriated to pay that debt. I believe that that
will be the doctrine which.will be held by the Supreme Court, and
I have no doubt that the law adopted by the English courts is not
the general maritime law. In this country we are governed, where
it is a question of maritime law, by the maritime law, the continental
law, or the law as it may be gathered from all the maritime nations
of the world. The English law, on the contrary, has been the
result of the conflict between the courts of common law, especially
the Court of King's Bench in Great Britain, which was jealous
alike of all other courts, as it was of the Court of Admiralty and
Ecclesiastical Courts, which was always issuing its prohibitions in
defence of what it supposed to be the exclusive right of the commonlaw courts, and to that spirit of asserting the extended and exclusive jurisdiction of the common-law courts in opposition to the
admiralty courts. To this is due alone the fact that the English
courts adopted the rule that for work and labor done on a vessel
in a home port there was no lien on the vessel other than the
common-law lien of possession, and that when that was parted with
the lien was gone.
I have no hesitation in saying myself, therefore, that the -rule
of allowing a lien for these repairs ought to be extended to a vessel
in a home port, as well as to a vessel in a foreign port, and that
this vessel, and this work and labor, are of a character which, in my
opinion, probably constitute such a lien, if the parties had permitted it to rest on the implied results of the work and labor done
under such circumstances. But, unfortunately, they did not. They
entered into a specified contract for this work. There is no doubt
about that contract, although some little doubt is expressed as to
the precise reliance placed upon it by Mr. Taylor. The contract
itself, I think, shows for itself what he did rely on, and that is the
trouble in this case. Before the vessel was docked, and before any
work was done on her, they made a specific agreement, which was
reduced to writing, not signed by the parties, but a memorandum
made by the agent of the wrecking company, and that agreement
is this: That if the repairs did not exceed $10,000 they were to
be paid for one-half in cash, and the balance in an endorsed note;
if they exceeded $10,000 they were to bt paid one-third in cash
and the balance in endorsed notes, payable, I think, in thirty,
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sixty and ninety days. As to what endorsed notes meant, there is
no controversy. It meant personal security. Now, the contract
was: that for this work I am going to do for you, you are to pay
me a considerable portion in cash, as the work progresses, or before
you get the vessel, and at the end of it you are to pay me the
balance in good negotiable notes, with proper and sufficient security. I have no doubt of the fact that a man doing that kind of
work may rely on the owner of the vessel, and that if he makes no
specific contract on the subject, he will have a right against the
owner and the vessel, and under some circumstances against the
master; but that is a lien which the law implies from the circumstances, and if a specific contract is made which shows that the
party relied upon other security and other modes of payment, then
he cannot enforce the admiralty lien. It is very clear to me,
here, that Captain Taylor, in making this contract, never intended
to rely on the security of the vessel itself, because lie made this
contract for the very best kind of other payment. What better
payment can a man have than secured papers ? And what is the
use of his relying on the vessel as security when he says: "Before
you get this.vessel out of my hands, you are to pay me one-half
cash, and the balance in endorsed notes with good security."
I think, having made an express contract for an express security, he cannot say "I did this work on the credit of the vessel."
In other words, I think if there is any question of admiralty lien, a
lien for supplies and repairs, that it must have been the intention
in the mind of the party who furnishes the supplies and repairs
whether in a home or foreign port, to rely on the credit of the vessel ; and although in a foreign port (and I suppose the same thing
would apply here when the supplies and repairs are necessary, and
nothing is said to the contrary), the law presumes a reliance on
the vessel, yet it is only a presumption. But it is said that in foreign ports such is the presumption, because the man who furnishes
the supplies is not there and may not know, anything of the owner.
If it can be shown that he did not rely on that alone, and that he
intended to rely on other security, which he supposed sufficient,
or which was supposed to be better, then he had no lien, because
the lien arises from implication, from the fact expressed or implied
that the man in furnishing the supplies or contracting a debt, relied
on the vessel as security, and if he relied on anything else it is
-mother security sufficient, or supposed to be, which, in case that
VOL. XXIIL-12
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turned out to be insufficient, does not restore his lien. I am sorry
for this result, because it seems this corporation is a mere sham,
and whether any party belonging to it may be individually liable
or not, I do not know. But the result of it is that this decree
,must be reversed. Now it has been very ably urged that if there
was no maritime lien, there were two other liens under which this
court ought to give relief. The first was that the plaintiff never
parted with the possession of the vessel, that he instituted this suit
when he had possession, and therefore he has the lien of common
law, the lien of a man who has done work on any instrument, or
vehicle, or piece of property, and retained the possession until he
is paid. I have no doubt he had the lien, or of the existence of
it. It is also said that the state gave a lien for these repairs
on the vessel. I have no doubt about that. But neither of these
liens is subject to the implication in regard to the maritime lien,
and it cannot be held, and it is not an admissible doctrine, that a
man can go into an admiralty court and assert an admiralty lien,
and when he fails in that, turn around and say: To be sure I did
not have a lien that would give jurisdiction, but now that you have
got hold of the thing, you must go on and enforce some other lien.
If such a condition of things existed, the result would be, that any
party could come into an admiralty court when he failed in maintaining an admiralty lien, having seized the vessel, and say:
"You have got possession of the vessel and now you must turn
round and administer the state law," and cite authorities to show
that the admiralty court will enforce the lien of the state law.
That is not now the doctrine of our courts. These cases have been
reversed and decided several times, and this court in admiralty
will not enforce the lien of the state laws. Decree reversed.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
TIE STATE

EX

REL.

NEWELL v. PURDY.

A promise by a candidate for office in consideration of receiving votes, to give
money or other valuable thing either to an individual or to the public, is within
the spirit of the laws against bribery ; and such promise as well as the votes thereby
obtained are void as against public policy.
A promise by a candidate to the voters at large to perform the duties of the office
for less than the salary fixed ly law is withia the same principle, and all votes obtained by means thereof will be rejected by the courts in the count.

Tiis was an action in the nature of a quo warranto brought to
determine which of the parties was entitled to the office of county
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judge of Vernon county. At the election for that office held in
April 1873, the relator received 1240 votes and the defendant
1217 votes therefor. Both parties claimed to be elected, both
filed the official oath and bond required by law, and the defendant
was in possession of, and performing the duties of the office, to the
exclusion of the relator.
Tle grounds upon which the defendant denied the right of the
relator to the office, as stated in the answer, were that after the
board of supervisors had fixed the salary of the county judge to be
elected at said election at $1000 per annum, the rehtor became a
candidate for the office, and for the purpose of inducing the electors
to east their votes for him, published and calised to be extensively
circulated through the county before the election, the following
communication :"To the voters and tax-payers of Vernon county-Gentlemen:
While I entertain the highest respect for the judgment and ability
of each member of our county board of supervisors in fixing the
salaries of the county officers, and am satisfied that no county has
a better board ; still I am well satisfied that the work and incidentals can be well done and furnished for the office of county judge
fbr a less sum than $1000 a year, and feeling satisfied that.I can
give satisfaction in the performance of the duties of that office, I
therefore, at the solicitation of many friends, announce myself a
candidate for the office of county judge, for the next term, at the
sum of $700 a year, and pledge myself that, if elected, I will do
the work and furnish-office, &c., for the said sum of $700 a year,
and shall consider myself under many obligations. Being, as I
am, personally acquainted with a large number of people of this
county, I need say nothing of my abilities to perform the duties
of that office. All of which is respectfully submitted.
" J. E. NEWELL."
It was alleged that this communication was by the relator placed
in the hands of the chairman of the board of supervisors of each
town and election district in said county, and by him, the said J.
E. Newell, caused to be read and was read to .the assembled voters
in each town and election disrict in said county on the morning
of the day of the election for said county judge.
The answer named one hundred voters and tax-payers of the
county, who, it was stated therein, voted at such election. Con-
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cerning the votes of these persons, the answer contained the following averments:"The defendant further shows upon information and belief that
the following legal voters and tax-payers of said county of Vernon,
.who voted at said election, before the said unlawful and corrupt
offers of the relator, J. E. Newell, were made to the voters and
tax-payers of said county, were intending to vote for this defendant for the office of county judge of said county of Vernon, at the
election next to be held and afterwards held in said county, as set
forth in the complaint of the plaintiff, but were uhlawfully and
wrongfully induced by said corrupt offers of the relator to change
their purpose, and vote for the said relator, and relying upon such
offers as being lawfully made, and that the same were legally binding upon the relator, did so change their purpose, and vote for the
relator for said office at said election and were influenced and induced so to do solely by reasons of saidicorrupt offers of the relator, J. E. Newell, and, but for said offers, would have voted for
this defendant for said office at said election."
The relator demurred to the answer of the defendant.

J. C Sloan, Atty. Genl., for the relator.
J. H. Carpenter, for the respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LYoN, J.-It is provided by statute as follows: "At the annual
meeting in November in every year her'eafter, the county board
of supervisors for the several counties shall fix and determine the
amount of the annual salary that shall be received by each and
every county officer who is to be elected in their respective counties during the ensuing year and whose annual salary the said
supervisors have now or may hereafter have authority to establish.
The salary thus determined upon for each and every such officer
shall be and remain his salary without increase or diminution during his term of office:" Laws of 1867, chap. 75, sects. 1 and 2
(J. S. 304, §§ 62, 63).
Chapter 121, Laws of 1868, conferred upon the board of supervisors authority to fix the salary of the county judge.
Pursuant to these statutes the board of supervisors of Vernon
county, at the annual meeting in November 1872, fixed the salary
of the county judge of that county, to be elected in the following
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April, at $1000 per annum. The annual salary of the judge then
elected was thus fixed at the sum named, for the whole term, and
the board of supervisors had and have no power to change it.
Hence the proposition of the relator to the electors of the
county which is set out in the answer, was simply an offer that if
they would elect him to the office of county judge lie would give
the county three hundred dollars per annum, together with certain
articles of personal property (the value of which is not stated), so
long as he should hold the office under such election.
In view of the absolute right of the person elected to receive
the salary fixed by the board, and which the board had no power
to change, the proposition of the relator admits of no other construction.
IIad the relator offered the same or any other sum of money, or
any property, to individual electors of the county for their votes,
all votes which he obtained thereby would be rejected by any court
called upon to determine his right to the office, and although the
election might not be declared void because of such offer, yet if
the number of votes so rejected were sufficient to change the result
of the election, judgment would go against the relator: State ex
rel. Hopkins v. Olin, 23 Wis. 327, and cases cited.
The case we have supposed involves the crime of bribery-but
that term has a more extensive signification. It may properly be
employed to define acts not punishable as crimes, but which involve
moral turpitude or are against public policy. In this case the
answer does not contain allegations of fact showing that the relator
or any of the voters of the county had been guilty of the criminal
offence of bribery, and the question is whether any act short of
that will justify the rejection of votes cast for the relator.
Hawkins in his treatise on the Pleas of the Crown, after defining
the term bribery, when used in a strict sense, that is as descriptive
of a crime, proceeds thus : "Also bribery sometimes signifies the
taking or giving of a reward for offices of a public nature. And
certainly nothing can be more palpably prejudicial to the good of
the public than to have places of the highest concernment, on the
due execution whereof the happiness of both king and people doth
depend, disposed of, not to those who are most able to execute them,
but those who are the most able to pay for them. Nor can anything be greater discouragement to industry and virtue than to
see those places of trust and honor which ought to be rewards of
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those who by their industry and diligence have qualified themselves
for them, conferred on such who have no other recommendation
but that of being the highest bidders, neither can anything be a
greater temptation to officers to abuse their power by bribery and
extortion and other acts -of injustice, than the consideration of the
great expense they were at in gaining their places and the necessity
qof sometimes straining a point to make their bargain answer their
expectation :" Vol. I., chap. 27., sec. 3. Again the same learned
author says: "It is of the utmost importance to the public welfare that, in the administration of the government, none but persons
competent to perform the duties of their offices should be admitted
into any department. But if the sale of offices were allowed to
those who have the patronage and appointment, it is evident that
there would be the greatest danger of situations being filled, not
by those whose talents fitted them for the station, but whose purses
enabled them to obtain it. The sale of offices may therefore
justly be ranked as an offence against the political economy of
the state :" Book I, ch. 32, p. 748.
It will thus be seen that the sale and purchase of an office is
considered as a kind of bribery. The effect of bribery, by the
rules of the common law, independently of any constitutional or
statutory provision on the subject, is thus stated by Lord GLENBERVIE, in his note to the case of St. Ives, 2 Election Cases (Douglass) 403: "It is essential to the very idea of election that it
should be free, and this has been declared by the legislature in the
statute of Westminster I. (3 Edward I., ch. 5), with regard to
elections in general, and by the Declaration of Rights (1 W. & M.
2 sess., ch. 2), with regard to elections 0f members of Parliament.
Hence it is understood that, independent of positive statutes
against bribery, whenever a person is returned in consequence of
an undue influence acquired by that means, his election is void;
and that every vote purchased by bribery is also void; the person
who gave his vote under such influence being to be considered as
if he had not voted at all."
It is believed that the term briberyi is here employed in the
larger sense mentioned in Hawkins, and includes the buying or
selling of an office or any unlawful payment of money to procure
an office, as well as the direct bribery of an elector.
As early as 1678, the House of Commons made a standing
order declaring it bribery if a candidate for the House should
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give or promise any gift or reward to the county, town or borough
from which he sought to be returned to Parliament, after writs of
election had been issued; and the order punished the person so
offending by expulsion and a limited disqualification: 2 Douglass
404. In later times the principle of this order has been enacted
into laws which impose severe penalties for any improper use of
mondy, or any promise to pay money to influence elections.
The statute of Westminster cited in Douglass, is this: "And
because elections ought to be free, the king commandeth upon
great forfeiture that no men by force of arms, nor by malice or
menacing, shall disturb any to make free election :" 8 Edward I.,
ch. 5 (A.D. 1275). The same principles have frequently been
recognised in this country. The cases in New Hampshire, cited
by the counsel for the defendant, are to the effect that it is against
public policy to sell public offices to those who will pay the most
for them, or to bestow them upon those who will discharge their
duties for the least compensation. It seems that a practice had
prevailed in that state of putting up at public auction and disposing
of the office of constable to the highest and of collector to the
lowest bidder.. In Tucker v. Aiken, 7 N. I. 140, the court says:
"Setting up an office at auction in the manner the town of Derry
did in this instance, has all the mischief of a sale. It has a tendency to divert the attention of the electors from the qualifications
of the candidates to the terms on which they will consent to serve,
and makes the choice turn upon considerations which ought not to
have an influence. * * * A collector thus chosen is not fit to be
trusted with the power to seize the goods and arrest the bodies of
citizens, especially of citizens who do not concur in the choice.
And if an action of trespass had been brought against Stowell.for
taking the goods mentioned in the declaration, he would probably
have found it very difficult to show a legal defence. In such a
case the legality of his election might have been examined and
settled."
Here is a strong intimation that an election thus obtained is
void, and such is the fair inference to be deduced from the other
cases in that state. If void, it is because the means employed to
secure the election contain, so far as the public and the state are
concerned, all the essential elements of bribery. It should also
be observed that the question in that state was not presented by
any constitutional or statutory provision, but was considered
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entirely on common-law grounds. In Alvord v. Collins, 20 Pick.
428, the court say: "We fully recognise the validity of the
objection to the sale of offices, whether viewed in a moral, political
or legal aspect. It is inconsistent with sound policy. It tends to
corruption. It diverts the attention of the electors from the personal merits of the candidates to the price to be paid for the office.
It leads to the election of incompetent and unworthy officers, and
on their part to extortion and fraudulent practices to procure a
remuneration for the price paid. Nor can we discover a difference
in principle between the sale of an office for a valuable consideration and the disposing of it to the person who will perform its
duties for the lowest compensation. In our opinion, the same
objection lies against both."
That court thu? agreed to the doctrine of the New Hampshire
court, but held that a collector of taxes was not within the principle, because his employment is not a public office.
A very notable case, in which the same principle was applied by
the legislature of Massachusetts, occurred in the year 1810. It
seems that certain towns were each entitled to several representatives in the legislature, and among them the town of Gloucester was
entitled to six representatives. Each town was required by law to
pay its own member, and for economical reasons the town of
Gloucester usually returned but two instead of six. For political
reasons it was thought desirable that the town should elect a full
delegation, and therefore certain individuals, with a view to induce
the town to do so, gave a bond for the use of the inhabitants, conditioned that the whole expense of a full representation should not
exceed the pay of two members, and six members were accordingly
elected. Although the members elected had no agency in procuring
such bond to be given, the House of Representatives, by a vote of
224 to 125, declared the election void and the seats of the whole
delegation from Gloucester vacated: Reports of Controverted
Election Cases, by Cushing, Story and Josselyn (Mass.) 97, Gloucester Case.
The doctrine which we think is established by the foregoing
authorities, a'hd which we believe to be sound in principle, is, that
a vote given for a candidate for a public office, in consideration of
his promise, in case he shall be elected, to donate a sum of money
or other valuable thing to a third party, whether such party be an
individual, a county or any other corporation, is void. The pover
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to reject suich vote is not vested in the election canvassers, but is
vested in the court, when called upon to determine judicially the
result of the election. The grounds upon which this doctrine is
based are so clearly and fully stated in the above extracts from
the authorities, that it seems unnecessary to repeat them. Indeed
every intelligent person knows that free, unbiassed and (in the
language ,ofsome of the books) indifferent elections are absolutely
essential to the existence of free institutions.
It was argued by the learned attorney-general that the proposition made by the relator to the voters of Vernon county was
merely a protest against high salaries. And being in the direction
of reform and economy in public expenditures, slould rather be
commended than censured.
Promises made to the people by candidates for public office,
that if elected they will practise a rigid economy in the expenditures of their several departments, arc unobjectionable, and if the
successful candidate fulfils his pledges in that behalf, he is entitled
to commendation. In such case the candidate only promises to
perfori a legal and a moral duty. For example, should a candidate for governor promise that, if elected, he would discharge all
persons employed by the state whose services are not needed, or
that he would prevent all unnecessary expenditure of public funds,
so far as he may have power to do so; this is only a promise that,
if elected, he will in those respects faithfully perform the duties
of ]iis office. In other words, it is a promise that he will not
violate his official oath. But should such candidate propose to the
voters and tax-payers of the state that if they will elect him to the
office of governor, he will serve the state therein gratuitously or
for one-half the salary allowed by the constitution, and pay. the.
rent of an executive office and the expenses of fuel, stationery and
other incidentals pertaining thereto, out of his own pocket, his.
proposition has an entirely different aspect. In the one case the.
candidate promises that, if he is elected, he will regard his official
oath and faithfully and honestly discharge his official duty; while
in the other case he proposes to buy the office with promises to pay
therefor in p.ersonal services or money or both. The one tends to
economy and true reform, but the tendency of the other is to
introduce into elections a most mischievous element, very nearly
allied to bribery-an element which never has been tolerated (and.
never can be with safety) by any free government. But we are.
VoL. XXIII.-13
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told that propositions similar to that of the relator are very frequently made by candidates for public offices. We have seen no
case in the books, and none is within the recollection of any member of this court, before the present case was brought to our notice,
where a candidate for an- important judicial office has offered to
donate money or official services to the public as a consideration
for his election. We must be permitted, therefore, to doubt
whether such transactions are of frequent occurrence. On the
contrary, we think they are not sustained by an enlightened public
sentiment, and that they occur very rarely. If the course pursued by the relator should receive judicial sanction, it is more
than probable that all those public offices which are deemed
desirable would in time become the objects of pecuniary bids or
offers, and in many cases would be bestowed upon the highest
bidders, without much regard to their fitness for the positions thus
purchased by them. At least such would be the inevitable tendency. The evils of such a condition are of very grave import,
and we are warned by the experience and wisdom of centuries to
avoid them.
When our elections to fill public offices cease to express the free,
intelligent and unbiassed judgment and choice of the electors;
when they shall be controlled or materially influenced by pecuniary
offers made by the candidates, whether to the electors or to the municipality (which is but the aggregation of the electors), a most vital
condition of free government will be disregarded. The tendency
might be, in such case, to banish from the public service all who will
not pay for the privilege of being employed therein, and to fill it
-with less scrupulous, and therefore less trustworthy and less deserving men. Elections by the people might thus cease to express
the free and unbiassed judgment and will of the people, but might
be controlled by mercenary considerations, either public or private,
or both, and would thus speedily and justly fall into public contempt. So far as we are advised, no judicial tribunal has given
any countenance whatever to any practice or act which tends in
that direction, but the courts have steadily held that popular
-elections must be kept free from any taint of corruption, and from
all improper or unlawful influences whatever. We have no dis1position to depart from this line of adjudication. On the con.
trary, where the opposite doctrine is asserted in any of the cases,
we should not follow them. We would not hold that a man may
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buy a public office, especially a most important and responsible
judicial office, just as he would buy a horse at auction, that is, by
offering to pay more for it than any other person is willing to pay.
We can never give the saiction of this court to a doctrine so pernicious.
h'eference should be inade to the cases which have sustained the
validity of bids or pecuniary offers to secure the location of public
buildings at some particular place. We have no controversy with
these cases here.
The distinction between the election of public officers to whom,
for the time being, the exercise of the functions of sovereignty is
intrusted, and the mere choice ofa site for a public building, is quite
apparent. The former involves, or may involve, the integrity of the
government and the preservation of the principles upon which it is
founded, while the latter is only a matter of public convenience or
pecuniary interest, involving no fundamental principle whatever.
It follows from the foregoing views that if the defendant succeeds in showing, as he alleges in his answer, that a number of the
electors, exceeding the majority of the relator, were influenced to
vote for the'relator solely by reason of the offers or propositions
made by him as aforesaid, the votes so obtained should be rejected
and the defendant adjudged entitled to the office.
The demurrer to the answer must therefore be overruled.
The foregoing opinion meets the question involved in the proper spirit as a
pure question of law, to he determined
upon clear principles or authoritative
precedents. But, except that in all such

stock ring would openly buy the Presidency itself With panem et circenses?
It is probable that the relator in the
present case was actuated by an honest
tholugh moot intjudicious spirit of public
caqee what may lie called the hixtorical economy, lut the principle is not for a
mnethod of treatment, is the safest and moment to le tolerated. It is the busimost sati.-hctory, it is almost a pity liess of courts and lawyers to guard
that the court took the trouble to cite againqt the entering wedge; the strinauthorities or arguments on such a sub- gency of precedent to govern even hard
ject. If the courts should support such cases in accordance with principle, somemeans of electioneering, how long would times at the expense of individual jusit be before some ambitious silver-miner tice, has no other justification.
or the representative of a New York
J. T. D.
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CARSON'S ADM'RS

L- AL. v. PHELPS, TRUSTEE, ET AL.

Carson being indebted to an estate of which he was trustee made a deed of cer.
tain of his real estate to himzelf as trustee. The deed was formally prepared by
counsel under his instruction and he executed and acknowledged it, but did not
plnce it on record. After his death. insolvent, it was found among the papers of
the truqt estate in his possession. Hed, 1. That the circumstances were sufficient
proof of a delivery; and 2. That the deed created a valid and binding trust against
Carson and his representatives and that the cestuis qfue truet were therefore entitled
to the property in preference to the administrator and creditors.
The omission of a stamp on the deed did not render it invalid or inadmissible in
evidence, in the absence of proof that the stamp was omitted with intent to defraud
the revenue.
The provision of the Maryland Code requiring an affidavit that the consideration
of a mortgage is true and bond fide applies to technical mortgnages only, not to
deeds of trust.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Baltimore. The facts appear
in the opinion of the court, which was delivered by
BARTOL, C. J.-This is a contest among the creditors of Thomas
J. Carson, deceased, as to the proper distribution of the money
arising from the sale of his real estate, made by Randolph Barton,
Esq., trustee. The property sold consists of two of the lots of
ground described in the deed of the 27th day of April 1868, executed and acknowledged by Thomas J. Carson, and purporting to
convey to himself as trustee, seven lots of ground in trust for the
uses and purposes therein mentioned. The appellee, Phelps, is
the trustee under the will of the late Samuel C. Edes, appointed
in the place of Thomas J. Carson, deceased, and the other appellees are the cestuis que trust under the same will, and claim
under the deed of the 27th day of April 1868, a lien and priority
in the fund, as against the general creditors of Carson, who were
such prior to the execution of the deed.
This lien and priority was allowed by the Circuit Court in ratifying the auditor's accounts C. and D., and is resisted by the
appellants upon several grounds which will be noticed hereafter.
The main question to be considered is the operation and effect of
the deed of April 27th 1868. The deed remained in the possession of Thomas J. Carson, and some months after his death, was
found among his papers relating to the estate of Edes, and was by
his administrators delivered to Mrs. Long, the administratrix de
bonis non of Edes.
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The appellants contend, that the deed having been retained in
Carson's possession during his lifetime, never was delivered by
him, and never became operative as a conveyance, or a contract
for a conveyance. They further contend that even if the deed
had been delivered(,it is not valid at law, and will not be held good
in equity as a contract; because being in the nature of a mortgage
an affidavit "that the consideration was true. and bond fide," as
prescribed by the Code, art. 24, see. 29, was necessary to render
it valid against creditors. It is also objected that the deed is
invalid for want of the stamp required by the Act of Congress
then in force. With respect to the last objection, the want of a
stamp, this defect appears to have been supplied by the affixing
of a stamp, and the payment to the collector of the penalty prescribed by the Act of Congress, which was held in (ook v. England, 27 Md. 28, and Dower v. Cushwa, Id. 854, to be a substantial compliance with the stamp law. But if this be not so, the
want of the stamp would not make the instrument invalid, or
render it inadmissible in evidence, in the absence of proof that
the stamp was omitted with intent to defraud the revenue, as was
decided at the present term in Black v. Woodrow & Richardson,
following and adopting the construction of the Acts of Congress,
which was established by the Supreme Court in Campbell v. Vilcox, 10 Wall. 422.
As to the want of an affidavit, the Code, art. 24, see. 29, declares
that "no mortgage shall be valid, except as between the parties
thereto, unless there be endorsed thereon an oath or affirmation of
the mortgagee, that the consideration in said mortgage is true and
bond fide as therein set forth." This provision has bepn construed
as applying to "deeds of mortgage technically such and not to deeds
of trust:" Stockett v. iollyday, 9 Aid. 492, 499. This instrument
is by its terms and operation a deed of trust not a mortgage; the
grantee took the property not as a mortgagee but as trustee, not only
in name but in reality, both from the nature of the estate conveyed
to him, and from his rights and duties thereunder; the property was
intended to be held by the grantee, as trustee for the benefit of the
parties therein named as cestuis que trust; no equity of redemption
in the property remained in the grantor; but there was a resulting
trust in his favor, under which after the exercise of the power of
sale by the trustee, lie would be entitled to receive in money, any
balance that might remain after the purposes of the trust were
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accomplished by paying to the ecstuis que trust in- remainder
under Ede's will, their respective shares of the trust fund. It is
very clear to us that to such an instrument, the provision of the
Code has no application, and that no affidavit was necessary.
The deed was regularly executed by Carson, attestcd and for'mally acknowledged according to law. To make it operative as a
conveyance delivery was necessary. Was it delivered ? this is the
next question to be considered.
The law on this subject is correctly stated by the judge of the
Circuit Court," that no particular form of procedure is necessary
to effect a delivery; it may be by words or acts, or by both combined; but in all cases the intention that it shall be a delivery
must exist, and acceptance may be presumed from the grantee's
possession." But the learned judge adds that "in this case the
possession is equivocal, the grantor and grantee being the same
person," and he came to the conclusion that "there are no circumstances from which an intention to deliver can be inferred."
In this conclusion we do not concur. An examination of the instrument with the facts and circumstances attending the transaction has satisfied us that there was a valid and effectual delivery
of the deel, and that such was the intention of Carson. It was
not a mere voluntary deed, but founded upon a valuable consideration. Carson as trustee under the will of Edes had, by the order
of the Orphans' Court, obtained possession of the fund remaining
in his hands as executor; he was under the strongest legal and
moral obligation to secure it to the parties entitled, the beneficiaries under the will. In addition to this, as shown by the recitals
in the deed, he had upon their request made an express contract
to secure the same. For that purpose the deed was prepared by
his attorney at his instance, and was formally executed, attested
and acknowledged, and was by him carefully preserved among the
papers relating to the trust estate. It is difficult to explain these
facts upon any other theory, than an intention on his part that
ihe deed should operate as a creation or declaration of trust for
the benefit and security of the parties in whose favor it was made.
The fact that the paper remained in his possession can have little
force or significance, in disproving a delivery. Being a conveyance to himself as trustee, after its acknowledgment, it was
in his possession in that character, and no longer under his moral
or lawful control as an individual. There could be nothing equivo-
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cal in such possession, as it was his legal duty to hold the deed as
trustee, the law presumes the possession was held by him in that
character.
' If a tru.tee act ambiguously, he cannot afterwards
take advantage of the doubt, and say he acted not as trustee, but
in some other character:" Lewin on Trusts 168.
".Where a man has several capacities, and is found in possession of
property, the law will attach the possession to the capacity in which
of right it ought to be held :" Flickinger v. Hall, 5 Gill 60.
The omission of Carson to place the deed upon record, is relied
on by the appellants as a significant fact to show that he did not
intend it a-s
a complete and binding act, but we think this is explained by the fact that he considered himself perfectly solvent as
late as 1869, as proved by the witness Vickery.
Being of opinion that the deed was perfected by delivery, and
that Carson's possession of it was in the character of trustee, it
operated to create a perfect and valid trust in favor of the appellees. "If a settlor propose to convert himself into a trustee,
there the trust is perfectly created and will be enforced so soon as
the settlor has executed an express declaration of trust, intended
to be final and binding upon him, and in this case it is immaterial
whether the nature of the property be legal or equitable, whether
it be capable or incapable of transfer :" Lewin on Trusts 56.
The same doctrine is stated in Hill on Trustees 51m, and on
page 63, the author says: " A trustee of real or personal property
may be created by any formal instrument, whether deed or will,
which passes the legal title to the trust estate, and contains a
proper declaration of trust, or without any transmutation of possession, the owner of property may convert himself into a trustee
of it, by a proper declaration of trust."
We refer also to faccubbin v. Cromwell, 7 G. & J. 157, 163,
164, and to Aldridge O Higdon v. Weem8 & Hull, 2 G. & J. 37,
47, 48.
This trust thus validly created is binding against Carson and
his representatives; and notwithstanding the failure to record the
deed it is valid and will be enforced in equity against his general
creditors. This doctrine is well settled and has been recognised
in Maryland in a great number of cases, and is alike applicable
whether the trust is expressly created by deed unrecorded, or whether
it arises from a valid contract in writing for specific security: Ive0l-echen v. faggs, 4 H. & G. 132; Tiernan v. Poor, 1 G. & J.
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216; 11Ioale v. Buchanan, 11 G. & J. 315; Repp v. lRepp, 1f
G. & J. 341; Alexrander v. Ghiselin, 5 G. 139, 185; Prite v.
McDonald, 1 Id. 403, 414, 415; Johnson v. (7 tnby, 2 M,. 216.
In this case the effect of the decision of the Circuit Court in ratifying accounts C and D, was to give 'to the appellees a lien and
priority over the general creditors of Carson, who were such at
the time the deed was executed: as to the subsequent creditors,
that is to say, those who became creditors after the date of the
deed, they were allowed to share pro rata in the distribution, in
the same manner as if the deed had not been mae. This mode
of distribution was adopted in conformity with the ruling in Pannell v. Farmers'Bank, 7 H. & J. 202, which was a case of unrecorded mortgage. Whether that rule was applicable to the present
case, it is not necessary to decide. The appellees have aiade no
objection to the account, or claimed any priority over the snasesequent creditors. So far as the appellants are cmcerned there
can be no doubt or question of the equitable rights of the appellees to their lien upon the fund, and to the priority allowed them
in account C.
The provisions of the Code, art. 24, sees. 19 and 21, allowing
deeds relating to land duly acknowledged, to be recorded at any
time, saving the rights of creditors and purchasers without notice,
cannot be construed as impairing the rights.of parties claiming
under a trust, or as affecting in any manner the equitable rights
and liens of parties, as recognised by the established doctrines of
courts of equity.
It appears from the record that at the time the deed of trust
was executed the property therein described was encumbered by
i previous mortgage executed by Carson, which contained a covenant providing for its payment by voluntary sales of the property
mortgaged. Five of the seven lots were afterwards sold and the
mortg.age released. The effect of that was simply to remove the
prior encumbrance and leave the two remaining lots unencumbered,
subject to the equitable rights of the cestuis que trust under the
deed, and gives no right to the appellants to claim a marshalling
of the fund, so as to subject the two remaining lots tn the payment of a proportional part of the original mortgage-debt. There
is no evidence in the case to lay the foundation for any such claim ;
and it is very clear that the rights of the appellees to their lien
and priority under the deel, could not be impaired either by the

U. S. v. PETERSBURG JUDGES OF ELECTION.

payment of the mortgage by Carson, or by the breach of trust
committed by him in selling a portion of the property.
We agree with the judge of the Circuit Court, that there is no
just ground for charging the appellees with laches in asserting
their rights, and being of opinion for the reasons stated that the
accounts C and D were properly ratified, the order of the Circuit
Courit is affirmed and the cause remanded.

United States Circuit Court. District of Virginia.
TIE UNITED STATES v. TIE PETERSBURG JUDGES OF ELECTION.
THE SAME v. TIE PETERSBURG REGISTRARS OF ELECTION.
An indictment charged that defendants unlawfully prevented, &c., from voting at
a municipal election in Petersburg, certain legally registered voters qualified according to law. Another indictment charged that defendants refuged to register certain legally qualified electors of African descent, as voters at the said election. On
demurrer it was held, by BOND, Circuit J., that the indictments were sufficient,
and that the motive of hostility to race, &c., might be inferred from the acts
charged ; by IlUGnES, J., contra, that the indictments were defective for not charging that the acts were done on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude, and that they should be quashed.
Per HuOHEs, J. The 4th section of the Enforcement Act of May 31pt 1870,
is not founded on the Fifteenth Amendment and is unconstitutional.
Id. The Federal Courts have no jurisdiction to protect rights which accrue from
the citizenship of a state, but only such as accrue from citizenship of the United
States. The right to vote belongs to the former class. It is not a natural or
inherent right but a privilege conferred or withheld by the several states in their
own discretion. The only guarantee of the United States in this connection is
under the Fifteenth Amendment, that no state shall deny or abridge the privilege
on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude. The only case in
which the Federal courts can entertain jurisdiction of any question upon this right
is where a violation of this guarantee is alleged.

TnE cases first named above were indictments against the judges who
held the municipal election of Petersburg in 1874, respectively at eight
precincts in that city. They charged that at a municipal election held
there on the 2d May 1874, these defendants (respectively naming three
at each precinct) did unlawvfully prevent and obstruct from voting divers
persons. to wit: A, B, &c., " citizens of the United States, twenty-one
years old, residents of Virginia for more than twelve months, and of
Petersburg for more than three months, resident and legally registered
voters in said election, and otherwise qualified by law to vote at said
election," at the said precincts respectively.
The second cases above named were indictments against the defendants
for refusing to register as voters certain citizens, &c. Seepostera, p 113.
The defendants demurred to the indictments on the grounds.
1. That there is no averment in any of the counts in the said indictVoL. XXIII.-14
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mert that the acts of commission and omission charged as criminal in
said indictment were done or omitted to be done because or on account
of "race, color, or previous condition of servitude" of the persons
whose rights are averred to have been denied, diminished, impaired, or
obstructed, by the alleged acts of commission and omission of the
defendants.

2. That the said acts and omissions are not averred to have been done
under color or in execution of any state law or authority.
3. That the Act of Congress. or that part of it on which the said indictment is formed, is unconstitutional and void.
R. T. Danild, for the demurrers.

L. L. Lewis, District Attorney, for the United States.
BOND, Circuit J., did not deliver a written opinion, but was in favor
of overruling the demurrers, on the ground, that as the motives of men
cannot be looked into or proved, except by their acts, it is sufficient to
charge that citizens of the United States were prevented from voting,
and that the motive of hostility to race may be inferred from the act of
preventing a colored voter from voting.

HUoHES, District J.-If
the election described, instead of being for
municipal officers, had been for a member of Congress or presidential
electors of the United States, these indictments, for reasons which need
not here be set forth, would have been valid to give jurisdiction to this
court, and would have been founded on those sections of the Enforcement Acts of Congress which expressly relate to national elections.
On the other hand, if the indictments had charged that the persons
prevented from voting at this state election were persons of Saxon, Celtic,
Mongol, African, or other descent, and that the defendants prevented
them from voting on account of race, then, being founded upon those
sections of the Enforcement Acts which were designed to enforce the
Fifteenth Amendment of the National Constitution. they would have
given jurisdiction to this court ; because the Fifteenth Amendment
expressly declares that "the right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
The offence charged, however, is clearly not within either of these
categories. If it had been, the jurisdiction of this court to try it would
have been undeniable.
The indictments are really founded upon the 4th section of the
Enforcement Act of May 31st 1,70.which declares that "If any person,
by force, bribery, threats, intimidation, or other unlawful means, shall
hinder. delay, prevent or obstruct, * * * any citizen from doing
any act required to be done to qualify him to vote, or from voting at
any election [by the people in any state, territory, district, county, city,
parish, township, school district, municipality, or other territorial subdivision], such person shall for every such offence * * * be guilty
of a misdemeanor, and shall, on conviction thereof, be fined, &c., or
imprisoned. &c., or both, at the discretion of the court."
This section is clearly not founded upon the Fifteenth Amendment,
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and, if constitutional at all, is so only by virtue of the clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which declare as follows: "All persons born
and naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they
reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, * * * nor
deny to any person the equal protection of the laws. Congress shall
have.power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article."
If this language of the Fourteenth Amendment, giving to Congress
power to legislate for preventing the abridgment of the rights of citizens of the United States, were not qualified by another provision of that
amendment, and were allowed its widest significatiun, then it is broad
enough to cover the 4th section of the Enforcement Act of May 1870,
which I have quoted, in the broadest signification of that section's
language ; and the national courts would have juriidiction to try any
offence abridging any right of any citizen of the United States on any
account; and the indictments at bar would give jurisdiction to this court
over the offences charged.
But is this language to be so interpreted ? Is it not rather to be limited
by construction ? If the latter, then the language is to be construed
according to rules of statutory interpretation, which are as much a part
of the statutory law as the statutes themselves. Although, as will appear
in the sequel, it is unnecessary for me to do so with reference to the eight
indictments under immediate consideration, I shall first treat this clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment as if it were not qualified by any other clause
in that amendment, or by the Fifteenth Amendment.
It is a settled principle of construction that all instruments are to be
interpreted according to their real intention and object; and when
statutes employ general terms, those terms are to be limited in giving
effect to the statutes, according to the real meaning of their authors,
rather than according to their literal meaning, so as to correct the evil
and advance the remedy contemplated by them. The illustration of
this principle, which is most familiar to the legal profession, is that
given by Blackstone, Book 1, p. 59. A law of Edward Ill. forbade all
ecclesiastical persons to purchase provisions at Rome. If the term
provisions had been given its widest meaning, it would have forbidden
any of the English clergy who might happen to be at .Rmiefrom buying
food; but the statute was construed with reference to its intentionwhich was to prohibit the purchasing of nominations by the Pope to
ecclesiastical benefices in England, which at that day were called provisions.
It is a general principle that the language of statutes is. if possible,
not to be so interpreted as to produce absurdity, or oppression, or evils
greater than those designed to bd remedied by them. Indeed, the very
function and province of a court is to construe and apply the law
according to its true meaning only, and for securing its real objects alone.
It is, therefore, perfectly competent for the national courts to discriminate between "the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States," alluded to by the Fourteenth Amendment, and to limit
the meaning of the acts of Congress passed to protect them (the fourth
section of the first Enforcement Act among others), so as to make them
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conform in practice to the spirit of the Constitution of' the United
States, which regards the National Government as one of limited,
express powers, and the governments of the states as of general
powers, not expressly enumerated. The authority of the courts to
enhtrge the powers of the National Government by con.-tructioun has
always encountered more or less disfavor. Their authority to linlit
those powers by construction has never been regarded with jealousy.
The only difficulty in thus discriminating lies in ascertaining the
principle on which to proceed and the line of distinction to be drawn in
regard to the privileges of the citizens of the United States intended
to be protected. I flatter myself, however, that this difficulty can easily
be surmounted in considering the questions raised upon the indictnments
before us.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in its decision in the
Slaughter-house Case-, 16 Wallace.36, has taken a part of' the responsibility of this task off of our hands. Those were eases in which the
subject of complaint was an act of the legislature of Louisiana.
That act created a joint stock company; empowered it to hold certain
estate near the city of New Orleans; required that all animals which
should be slaughtered within a large territory surrounding that city
should be slaughtered upon the premises of this company; and gave it,
in these and other respects, exclusive rights in abridgment of the like
rights of other citizens, and especially of persons fbllowing the trade of
butchering in the area described.
The United States Supreme Court held that the National courts had
no jurisdiction to protect citizens of Louisiana, though they were
citizens of the United States, in such privileges as were abridged in the
act of incorporation complained of, passed by the legislature and
approved by the Supreme Court of the state. In its decision in these
cases, pronounced by Justice MILLEt, the Supreme Court say, 16 WVal.
lace 77, 78: "Was it the purpose of' the Fourteenth Amendment,
by the simple declaration that no state should make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States, to transfer the security and protection of all the civil
rights which we have mentioned from the states to the Federal Government? And where it is declared that Congress shall have power to
enforce that article, was it intended to bring within the power of' Congress the entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively
to the states ?
" All this and more must follow if the proposition of the plaintiffs in
error be sound. For, not only are these rights subject to the control
or Congress whenever in its discretion any of them are supposed to be
abridged by state legislation, but that body may also pass laws in
avance, limiting and restricting the exercise of legislative powers by
the stateq, in their most ordinary and" usual functions, as in its judgment it may think proper, on all such subjects.
"And still further, such a construction, followed by the reversal of
the judtment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in these cases, would
constitute this court a 'perpetual censor upon all legislation of the states
on the civil rights of their own citizens, with authority to nullify such
as it did not approve as consistent with those rights as they existed at
the time of the adoption of this amendment. The argument, we admit,
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is not always the most conclusive which is drawn from the consequences
urged against the adoption of a pardeular construction of an instrument.
But when, as in the ca.e before us, these consequences are so serious,
so ftr-reaching and pervading, so great a departure fr,,n, the structure
and spirit of our intitutions ; when the effect is to fetter and degrade
the state gvernments by subjecting them to the cintrol of Con'gress in
the exercise of powers heretofore universally conceded to them, or the
most ,ordinary and fundamental character; when, in fact. it radically
changes the whole theory of the relations of the state and Federal
governments to the people; the argument has a force that is irresistible,
in the absence of language which. expresses such a purpose too clearly
to admit of doubt. We are convinced that no such results were intended by the Congress which proposed those amendments, nor by the
legislatures of the states which ratified them."
Th:s august court accordingly decided that it had no jurisdiction to
protect the privileges which were abridged by the act of incorporation
complained of; the privileges abridged being those which belong to citizens of the state as such, and distinguished from those which attached
to them as citizens of' the United States.
Its decision authorizes us to construe the clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment in question, and the Acts or Congress passed to enforce
them, according to their direct historical object, rather than their mere
literal nieaning; and, more particularly, so to construe them as to discriminate between those rights of the citizen which lie has as a citizen
of a state and those which belong to him as a citizen of the United
States.
In Corfiehl v. Cwnyel, 4 Wash. C. C. Reports 371, Justice WasHINGTON defined the privileges and immunities which belong to citizens
of the states as such to be those which lie called "fundamental ;" such
as " belon g of right to citizens of all governments, and always belonged
to citizens oif the several states of this Union from the time of their
independence." They embrace those rights which belong to a man as
a menber of society, together with those which tile Constitution and
laws of his state confer upon its citizens.
On the other hand, the rights which we have as citizens of the
United States are such as are implied in tile language of Judge TANEY,
when lie declared that " we are citizens of the United States for all the
great purposes for which the Federal government was established."
For instance, a man as a citizen of Virginia may carry onl a business
here by paying a certain tax ; in virtue of which Thct a citizen of Maryland, as a citizen of the United States. has a right to carry on the like
business in Virginia by the payment of no greater tax. So. under the
Constitution of the state, a mail born in Virginia is a citizen here after
a certain age ; by virtue of which fact lie miay become, under tile Constitution of tie United States, a citizen of New York by a change of
residence to that state. This parallel between the rights held by citizens, respectively, in their two characters, might be run out through
many examples ; but the distinction is too plain to need further illustration. For other decisions on the subject, see 9 Wheat. 203; 11 Pet.
102; 5 Wall. 471; 8 Id. 180I; 9 Id. 41; and 1) Id. 430.
Adopting this broad distinction, and availing of the authority given
by the Supreme Court in its decision in the Slauglter-house'Cases,the

U. S. r. PETERSBURG JUDGES OF ELECTION.

national courts are justified in refusing to take cognisance of offences
committed in violation of those rights which belong to a person as the
citizen of a state not created or conferred, but only guaranteed by the
National Constitution ; and in confining their jurisdiction to those rights
which belong to persons peculiarly in their character as citizens of the
United States.
This much being settled, and inasmuch as the fourth section of the
entrcement of May, 1870, concerns only the citizen's right of voting,
it is only necessary to inquire how the right of voting attaches to the
citizen ; whether in his character as a citizen of the state or in that of
a citizen of the United States.
Before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment a man was a
citizen of the United States only derivatively, by virtue of his being a
citizen of a state. Such was the principle of the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Dred Scott v.
Sanford, 19 Howard 393, in which that court expressly decided that
as a man of African descent was not the citizen of any state, therefore
he could not be a citizen of the United States. By the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the new status of citizenship of the United
States, independently of that of citizenship of the state, was first established; but it does not follow that the incorporation of this new provision into our national polity has abolished or obliterated the line of
distinction which the national courts had claimed the power to draw
between the rights of a person as citizen of a state and those which he
had as citizen of the United States. There is not yet any general act
of Congress clothing the citizen of the United States propro iyore
with all the rights of the citizen of the state where he resides, and
giving the national courts express jurisdiction to protect those rights.
Certainly there can be no law of Congress found which directly purports to constitute any citizen of the United States a voter in the state
in which he resides. Indeed, such a law would seem to be unconstitutional; for the Fourteenth Amendment itself contains a clause which
leaves-to the states the power, always before possessed by and conceded
to them, of prohibiting citizens of the United States from voting, and
of declaring who shall be voters, even in national elections. That
amendment, in the second paragraph. provides that "when the right to
vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and VicePresident of the United States, representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhubitants of such state, being
twenty-one years old, and citizens of the United States. except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male
citizens bears to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of
age in such state." Thus the right to vote, even of citizens of the
United States, is left, even by the Fourteenth Amendment itself, to be
regulated and defined by the states, which had always held that power.
The state of Virginia hast accordingly exercised this prerogative, pursuant to her own uncontrolled views of justice and propriety, in the
first clause of the third article of her state constitution, which is in
these words: " Every male citizen of the United States twenty-one
years old who shall have been a resident of this state twelve months,
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and of the county, city, or town in which he shall offer to vote three
months next preceding any election, shall be entitled to vote upon all
questions submitted to the people at such election ;" following this
general provision with the usual exceptions of persons comitting
crime, &c.
And here I will remark that the right to vote would seem to be not
fundamental; not a natural right. The power to declare who shall be
voters, who shall be constituents of the political sovereignty of a state,
has been claimed by and conceded to each state from the beginning of
our independence; and is expressly conceded by the clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment which I last quoted. The right to vote would
seem to be not an inherent right, but a conferred privilege; a privilege
not derived from the United States, but from the state alone ; a privilege belonging to the man as a citizen of the state, and not to him in
his character as citizen of the United States. The noble liberality of
Virginia in making every citizen of the United States resident within
her borders a voter in every election, does not in any degree change the
flict that he derives this rightfrom herself. Nor does the obligation of
the United States to guarantee to the states a republican form of government change the fact now existing, and which has existed from the
founding of the Union, that to the states is left the power or defining
and regulating the right of suffrage-a power without. which a state
could scarcely be considered as any longer retaining its autonomy.
It being, therefore, incontrovertible that the right to vote in a state
election belongs to a man as the citizen of his state, it remains to ask
what right *connected with voting belongs to him as a citizen of the
United States. Under the Fifteenth Amendment his right as h national
citizen is-not to be prevented from voting "on (iccount of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude;" which is a right not involved in the
indictments at bar. Has he any similar right in his national character
under the Fourteenth Amendment? Whatever right the national citizen, as such, may have, under the general terms of the Fourteenth
Amendment, not to be abridgedin his privileges or immunities, so far as
other privileges are concerned, yet that amendment gives him no such
right as to the privilege of voting, because it,
expressly leaves to the
states the power of regulating the right of suffrage in both state and
national elections. It is therefore plain that not only is the right to
vote derived from the state, and not only does it belong to the category
of rights which it is peculiarly within the province of the state tribunals
to protect, but it is excepted by the Fourteenth Amendment from those
general privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States which
the states are forbidden to abridge. It is indeed a right which the
states are expressly allowed to abridge in every other respect than on
account of race, color, and previous servitude.
If the Constitution gives this permission to the states, then no Act of
Congress forbidding the abridgment of this right on other account than
of race, color, &c., is constitutional, and no indictment founded upon such
a law is valid to give jurisdiction of the offence charged to the national
courts.
It is contended that from whatever source a right comes to a citizen
of the United States, yet, once attaching to him, it is competent for
Congress and the United States courts to protect him in it. This argu-
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ment would confer the power and duty of protecting the citizhn of the
United States from any of the ordinary offences at common law, such as
murder, ihlse imprisonment, and the like. This cannot be a sound proposition. There is an obvious distinction to be mdde on this subject.
Although still unnecessary to my argument as to the eight indictments mentioned, I will advert to the distinction which should be drawn
between rights proper and those improper for th jurisdiction of the
national courts. It is that so well stated by Justice BRADLEY in his
opinion in the case of the UVnited States vs. (rtikshank et als., reported
in 13 American Law Register 630, where the learned justice distinguishes between those provisions of the National Constitution which
guarantee fundamental rights, the duty of' protecting which properly
belongs to the states, and those provisions which -either create rights or
enjoin affirmative legislation upon Congress for their protection.
I cannot but express a cordial and full concurrence in the following
remarks of Justice BRADLEY on that subject. ie says:
With regard to those acknowledged rights and privileges of the citizen which form a part of his political inheritance derived from the
mother country, and which were challenged and vindicated by centuries
of stubborn resistance to arbitrary power, they belong to him as his
birthright, and it is the duty of the particular state of which he is a
citizen to protect and enforce them, and to do nought to deprive him of
theirfull enjoyment.
"When any of these rights and privileges are secured by the Constitution of the United States only by a declaration that the state, or the
United States, shall not violate or abridge them, it is at once understood
that they are not created or conferred by the C3onstitution, but that the
Constitution only guarantees that they shall not be impaired by the
state, or the United States, as the case may be.
"The fulfilment by the United States of this guaranty is the only
duty with which that government is charged.
"The affirmative enforcement of the rights and privileges themselves,
unless something more is expressed, does not devolve upon it, but belongs
to the state government as a part of its residuary sovereignty."
If this distinction be correct, then, as the right of voting is not conferred by the National Constitution, nor even guaranteed by that instrument, except in a qualified and negative way by the Fifteenth Amendment, it is not one of those rights over which, when proposed to be
exercised in a state election, Congress or the national courts have
jurisdiction.
Thus are we brought by legitimate argument, founded upon the decision in the Slaughter-house Cases, and the very able one in the Cruikshank Oise, to a conclusion against the vlidity of the eight indictments
pending against the judges of election of Petersburg.
But there is a much more direct method of reaching the same conclusion, which avoids a resort to the power of construction, and which
renders useless the distinction drawn by the national courts in the cases
alluded to between the rights belonging to a person respectively in his
two characters of citizen of the state and citizen of the United States,
and between the rights created or conferred and those merely guaranteed by the National Constitution. It is this
Admit for argument's sake that the Fourteenth Amendment, in its

U. S. v. PETERSBURG JUDGES OF ELECTION.

first paragraph, was intended to prohibit the abridgment of any privilege of the citizen by the state, or by its citizens, on any account whatever; yet the second paragraph of the same amendment, which leaves
to the states the power always held by them to prescribe the qualifications for suffrage at their pleasure in national and state elections, expressly excepts the right of voting from those general privileges; and
the most that can be insisted upon is that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects the citizen of the United States in all privileges except the
right of voting, and leaves this right to be regulated ad libitun by the
states. It was this latter fact which created the necessity for the Fifteenth Amendment, and that amendment would mean nothing, and
would have been wholly unnecessary if before its adoption the states had
not had uncontrolled power over the right of suffrage. Its sole object
was to limit the unrestrained power of the state over this right which
had been conceded by the Fourteenth Amendment; but it undertook to
limit the power only in one respect. It declared in substance that notwithstanding the states possessed uncontrolled power over this right theyshould be restricted in exercising their power at least this far, to wit:
They should not deny or abridge the right of the citizen to vote "on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
I am, therefore, of opinion that any law of Congress is unconstitutional which makes the preventing of a voter from voting in a state.
election penal on any other account than of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; and that any indictment charging such an offence,
though founded upon such a law or section of a law of Congress, is invalid to give 'jurisdiction of such an offence to this court. I think,.
consequently, that the demurrers of the defendants to the eight indictments against the Petersburg judges of election are good, and that theindictments should be quashed.
I. The three indictments pending against certain registrars of election in Petersburg differ in two respects as to the questions which I
have been considering, from those pending against the judges of election.
1. They allege that the persons who were prevented from registeringwere of African descent, but omit to charge that they were prevented.
from registering "on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude." These are not indictments, therefore, founded upon theFifteenth Aumendment or any Act of Congress passed for enforcing it.
We are not at liberty to infer from the mere circumstance that a man.
was of any particular race, and prevented from exercising a right, that
lie was so prevented on account of his race. That fact must be charged
before it can be proved, and the failure to charge it is, I think, fatal to.
these indictments, so far as the Fifteenth Amendment and the statutes..
enforcing it are concerned.
2. These three indictments each charge in substance that thedefendant "did refuse and knowingly omit to give to all citizens
of the Uilited States in his ward the same and equal opportunity,.
without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude,.
to register, &e.; but, to the contrary thereof, refused find knowingly:
omitted to give A, B, C, D and E the opportunity to register which he.
gave to others, the said A, B, C, D and E being qualified, &c., and.
citizens of the United States of "African race and descent." By not.
eharging that the refusal was on account of the race, &c., of the injuredh
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